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My research in the Rockefeller Archive Center is part of a larger project, tentatively 
titled, “Land as the Object of Development in Turkey, 1945-1980,” that examines 
contests over land reform as a central site of statecraft, population management, 
and modernization, where competing visions of agricultural development, upheld 
by leftist intellectuals, populist politicians, and American experts, were 
implemented or stalled over the decades. The larger project examines how 
different approaches to rural development, rooted in the country’s political 
economy, class configurations, and nationalist project, provided both the 
motivation for and alternatives to “adopting” rural development models urged by 
American advisors.1 
 
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, US military planners and agricultural experts took 
with them the notion that land reform would curb a revolutionary peasantry and 
replace it with an entrepreneurial class of landowners across the “Asian defense 
perimeter,” to Japan, Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and ultimately 
Vietnam.2 Yet, it was increasingly the “technical” model of land reform, rather than 
the redistributionist one, that prevailed in the projects of policymakers and 
experts. While American agencies and private organizations, such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation, were at first tolerant observers of programs like the ejido 
system in interwar Mexico, which seized private estates and distributed them to 
millions of landless peasants, they increasingly pushed for an industrialized 
version of agricultural reform. The Ford Foundation’s community development 
projects in India were replaced with Green Revolution technologies, as rural 
programs began to concentrate on seed types, yields, mechanization, and 
increasing rates of agricultural productivity.3 Massive projects, such as dams and 
TVA-style development spread across Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and others, while 
land reform in Vietnam was redefined as resettlement projects and the Strategic 
Hamlet Program of 1962. 4  The consolidation of land became the rule, as 
fragmentation was identified as an obstacle to efficiency. 
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The story of American-supported land reform played out somewhat differently in 
postwar Turkey, when the country became a beneficiary of Marshall Plan funds. 
The European Recovery Program mostly displaced a proposed Land Reform Bill of 
1945, which was to eliminate landlessness among the peasantry by redistributing 
the properties of absentee landlords to the tenants and sharecroppers who worked 
on them. Instead, the Marshall Plan allocated agricultural machinery and built 
highways across the country, which ultimately benefited large landowners.5 Still, 
the American model was not imposed on a blank state. Its full adoption was carried 
out by the Democratic Party (DP), which came to power in 1950, representing large 
landowners, commercial farmers, and small merchants.  
 
After a coup displaced DP from power, the military government proposed land 
reform in 1961, only to see the attempt halted by another center-right party after 
the resumption of multiparty politics within a year. Throughout the 1960s, the 
Turkish Workers’ Party ran a campaign that emphasized the importance of land 
reform, but internal debates among leftist Turkish intellectuals and political 
activists as to the character of Turkish agriculture was interrupted by yet another 
military intervention in 1971.6 A similar story played out in the aftermath of this 
coup, when the Republican Party (CHP) undertook modest redistribution in 
eastern provinces before they were ousted by a center-right coalition. It should be 
noted that these attempts were consistent with a longstanding identification of 
small landownership with nationalist sentiment. The republican policymakers and 
intellectuals argued that appropriating land from Kurdish landlords would 
dissolve feudal relations of production and eradicate the economic base of Kurdish 
identity.7 Land reform projects were also entangled with population exchange and 
resettlement policies and were thus emblematic of the Republican desire to limit 
or at least manage mobility in rural areas.8 
 
Land reform debates among the country’s ruling elite did not take place in the 
absence of international interlocutors. For instance, when policymakers and 
businessmen convened for a seminar on “Land Reform and Economic 
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Development” in Istanbul in 1971, presenters included representatives of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization and the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID).9 USAID’s work in Turkey in the 1960s addressed the question of “rural 
development,” in ways that the organization hoped would avoid what they deemed 
to be the failures of “the ‘Marshall Plan’ approach.” One AID-commissioned report 
from 1964 outlined an alternative strategy that would take advantage of new 
opportunities, such as the establishment of a Ministry of Rural Affairs, and 
encourage private enterprise rather than rely on agricultural loans and counterpart 
funds.10 The report urged the creation of a new administrative unit to oversee the 
marketing, supply, storage, and distribution of agricultural commodities and 
requisites, such as fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides. As for land reform, the 
rapporteurs counseled support for policies that would combine methods of 
fragmentation with consolidation, and limiting redistribution to state, rather than 
private, land holdings. 
 
The year 1965 marked a new phase in agricultural development techniques with 
the import of Mexican wheat to Turkey for the first time.11 This initiative had its 
roots in the Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) dating 
back to 1943. The popularization of Norman Borlaug’s breeding techniques and 
the international circulation of these seeds across Latin America, South Asia and 
the Middle East was overseen by the International Maize and Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT). In 1965, the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture succeeded in obtaining 
20,000 tons of Mexican seeds. While USAID refused to finance the procurement 
under PL 480 and encouraged the Turkish government to use its own foreign 
exchange sources and to negotiate an off-setting agricultural development loan 
later, the agency did provide extension agents for the project with assistance from 
Oregon State University. These agents offered training for the adoption of the new 
seeds, which arrived alongside new supplies of nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers, 
which were imported and distributed through a new agricultural supply agency. 
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The arrival of the new material also led to the signing of a mutual cooperation 
agreement between the Government of Turkey and the Rockefeller Foundation on 
April 28, 1969, resulting in the establishment of a wheat research and training 
project centered in Ankara in 1970. According to official RF publications, the 
timing of the Turkish government’s interest in wheat research was serendipitous, 
since the Foundation’s plans to establish a regional program based in Lebanon had 
just been cancelled due to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.12 As Mexican wheat rapidly 
spread across coastal Turkey, Bill Wright, an RF agronomist was appointed as the 
co-director of the Ankara project along with Ahmet Demirlicakmak, a local wheat 
scientist. In 1971, Wright was joined by plant pathologist Michael Prescott, plant 
breeder Arthur Klatt, Oregon State University agronomist Floyd Bolton and finally, 
by economist Charles Mann, who also taught at the economics department at 
Middle East Technical University. It is their correspondences and reports that I 
examined during my research at the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
 
The writings of the members of the Wheat Training and Research Project chronicle 
both the successes (very high yield in both 1975 and 1976, likely aided by good 
weather) and the failures encountered on the field.13 An outcome of the program 
that was deemed to be particularly successful was the training of wheat scientists 
abroad, with joint funding from RF, USAID, and the FAO. Twenty-two scientists 
received graduate degrees in American universities (especially Oregon State 
University) and another twenty-eight received training at CIMMYT’s nine-month 
in-service course in Mexico. By the end of 1975, the Wheat Training and Research 
Project operated at twelve different locations across Turkey, working on creating 
high-yield, disease-resistant types of wheats.14  
 
Among the difficulties that the project encountered in Turkey were farmers’ 
resistance to adopting the new seeds and technologies, as well as the fact that the 
Mexican varieties were not strongly resistant to Turkish strains of two fungus 
diseases, septoria leaf blotch and stripe rust. The 1970s were also a time of turmoil 
and instability both in Turkish domestic politics and in Turkish-American 
 6 R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  
relations. In one example, Bill Wright, the co-director of the project, complained 
that he dealt with eight ministers of agriculture in the five years he spent in the 
country. He wrote: “it seems that just as you get one educated to the point where 
he can be useful, off he goes and in comes a new one who doesn’t know wheat from 
bananas.”15 
 
Still, various Turkish governments offered cooperation through regulations that 
eased the efforts of the wheat research and training project. In 1975, for instance, 
teams of RF researchers and extensions agents set up farmer demonstration plots 
in Ankara provinces. The demonstrations displayed the “package” of “best” 
practices for tillage implements, herbicides, fertilizers, and seeding dates, based 
on complex experiments which were conducted at the research laboratory in 
Ankara. Among their recommendations were improved tillage to conserve soil 
moisture through the fallow season and the use of fertilizer-responsive and 
disease-resistant varieties of seeds. When Charles Mann, the economist, compared 
the costs and returns of traditional methods and those on display at the 
demonstrations, he concluded that “the recommended practices cost only 25 
percent more than usual farmer’s practices, but output increased so much that the 
ratio of increased benefits to increased costs averaged over 5 to 1.”16 
 
Elsewhere, Mann and other RF researchers contemplated the relationship between 
farm size and the beneficiaries of “improved technology.”17 The evaluation of new 
production practices in relation to “alternative enterprises in farming systems of 
the country” had in fact been an early rationale for the wheat research and training 
program.18 In 1973, Resat Aktan, an Ankara University agricultural economist, 
conducted a field survey of 1250 farmers for CIMMYT. The study posed questions 
about the adoption of improved technologies, such as seeding, harvesting, 
fertilizing and irrigation along with questions about land tenure status, size and 
fragmentation of farms.19 Aktan’s brief stint as Minister of Agriculture in 1974, 
followed by his subsequent return to Ankara University and his other writings on 
land reform, are a further testament to the imbrications of Turkish intellectuals, 
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policymakers, and American agencies, such as the Rockefeller Foundation during 
this period.20 “Land as the Object of Development” will examine these intellectual 
and political entanglements in further detail in order to show that American 
advisors’ visions for agricultural development were not imposed on blank slates, 
but were rather in dynamic conversation with local material and political realities.   
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